GROUNDFISH MANAGEMENT TEAM REPORT ON PRIORITY TRAILING ACTIONS UNDER TRAWL RATIONALIZATION SLATED FOR PRELIMINARY ACTION

The Groundfish Management Team (GMT) reviewed the reports under this agenda item and received a briefing from Mr. Jim Seger. Mr. L.B. Boydstun also participated in this discussion. Some potential benefits and costs were discussed relative to Community Fishing Associations (CFAs) and risk pools in general, but it is yet uncertain how these collectives will perform, and how the fishery overall will be affected. The GMT suggests that information regarding CFAs and risk pools remain transparent and available for analysis so that their relative benefits and costs to individual fishermen, to the collectives themselves, and to local communities can be evaluated and monitored.

Regarding whether CFAs and risk pools should be allowed to exceed existing control limits and/or the degree to which they should exceed these control limits, it is unclear how changing control limits will affect individuals, collectives, and fleet-wide behavior in the future. That is, with or without control limit allowances, how these collectives will change the current distribution of fishing effort and quota share and quota pound (QS/QP) holdings, and the magnitude and direction (i.e., positive or negative) of potential impacts on fishing operations and communities is not known.

In general, some potential benefits and costs relative to CFAs and risk pools were noted during the GMT’s discussion of these items. These potential benefits and costs may include, but are not limited to:

1) increased communication and information sharing between fishermen and/or communities;
2) more cooperative rather than competitive behavior between fishermen and/or sectors within a community;
3) increasing a fisherman’s and/or community’s ability to plan for current and future fisheries changes;
4) the redistribution of QS/QP from communities with historical landings, to communities without historical landings but an interest in participating in this fishery;
5) possible local effects on ecological communities due to concentration of QS/QP in particular geographic areas;
6) decreasing the total number of vessel accounts with deficits fleet-wide and the magnitude of these deficits, relative to constraining species (e.g., yelloweye, cowcod) allocations; and
7) whether fishermen within risk pools will engage in more or less risk relative to constraining species allocations and possible rollover provisions (i.e., account deficits will “rollover” to the following year).

Some or all of these items may result in higher or lower probabilities of exceeding constraining species allocations fleet-wide, changes in the distribution of fishing effort and QS/QP holdings geographically, and impacts to associated fishing operations and communities.

PFMC
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