James R. Walpole  
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Washington D.C. 20230

Dear Mr. Walpole:

You have asked for the assistance of the Department of Justice Antitrust Division ("Department") in identifying antitrust issues associated with a price arbitration system that was proposed as part of a rationalization plan to manage crab fisheries in the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands ("BSAI"). The plan was developed by the North Pacific Fishery Management Council ("Council") at the request of Congress to replace the current management program. The NOAA General Counsel's Office, Alaska Region, also has asked the Department to comment on the likely effects on competition of the entire rationalization plan. The Department submits these comments in response to your January 9, 2003 letter and NOAA's request.

1A fishery means "(1) one or more stocks of fish that can be treated as a unit for purposes of conservation and management and that are identified on the basis of geographic, scientific, technical, recreational, or economic characteristics, or method of catch; or (2) any fishing for such stocks." 50 C.F.R. 600.10.

2The Council is one of eight Regional Fishery Management Councils established pursuant to 16 U.S.C. 1852. Its region covers the States of Alaska, Washington and Oregon, and it has authority over the fisheries in the Arctic Ocean, Bering Sea and Pacific Ocean seaward of Alaska. 16 U.S.C. 1852(a)(1)(G). The functions of the Council include preparing for the Secretary of Commerce a fishery management plan for each fishery, conducting public hearings on fishery management plans, and reviewing processing in each fishery. 16 U.S.C. 1852(h). The Council was directed by the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001 (Pub. L. No. 106-554) to determine whether rationalization is needed in its fisheries and to analyze individual fishing quotas, processor quotas, fishermen cooperatives and quotas held by communities.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Department supports implementation of a new fishery management plan that would end the "race to fish" inherent in the current derby-style management plan. Under the current derby-style program, the season ends as soon as the total allowable catch has been fished, producing an undesirable "race to fish" among harvesters. The race to fish is economically inefficient for both harvesting and processing and likely dangerous to the participants. The Department therefore recommends that NOAA support individual fishing quotas ("IFQ") for harvesters; a reform that will end the race to fish. Provided that IFQ are easily transferable, the gains in efficiency from ending the race to fish — reducing overcapitalization and improving safety — are likely to outweigh the harm of any loss of competition among harvesters. The Department recommends that the plan allow easy transferability of IFQ shares; otherwise the incentive for market participants to make efficient investment decisions will be reduced.

The Department further recommends that NOAA oppose individual processor quotas ("IPQ"), because IPQ will likely reduce beneficial competition among processors with no countervailing efficiency benefit. This lost competition could deter the development of new processed crab products, reduce the incentives for processors to make efficient investment decisions and reduce welfare for consumers of processed crab products. While harvester quotas should eliminate the harmful race to fish, processor quotas are not justified by any such beneficial competitive purpose.

If the goal of using IFQ is to compensate processors for overcapitalization, we urge NOAA to consider advocating more direct solutions, such as a program to buy excess processor equipment. We also understand that there are concerns with social goals such as preserving jobs in historic fishing villages. To the extent NOAA agrees with these goals, we recommend it consider advocating more direct solutions.

The Department also urges NOAA to oppose any form of sanctioned price arbitration. Allowing an arbitrator, rather than the market, to set price may distort the incentive of processors and harvesters to make efficient investments. Further, processors and harvesters must be cautious not to use the arbitration program as a way to agree on price with their competitors, which could violate the antitrust laws.

3 The Department of Justice has supported individual fishing quotas in the past. See, e.g., Comments of the Department of Justice in Proposed Rulemaking: Amendment 18 to the Fishery Management Plan for Alaska Groundfish Fisheries in the Bering Strait and Aleutian Islands, Docket No. 911215-1315 (Transferrable individual fishing rights would result in an efficient allocation of limited fishery rights.); Business Review Letter to the Pollock Conservation Cooperative, February 29, 2000 (The Department is not presently inclined to initiate an enforcement action against cooperative that allocated amongst itself the fixed quota of the BSAI pollock TAC.)
The binding arbitration proposal specifies that each processor will participate in arbitration individually and not collectively. Processors' independent participation in binding arbitration will not violate the antitrust laws. In contrast, competing processors that agree on the price they will pay harvesters would be engaged in price fixing that violates the Sherman Act. Liability cannot be avoided by having a third party arbitrator set the actual price to be paid. Similarly, competing processors that agree to use the non-binding benchmark arbitration price to set ex-vessel prices (or even as a starting point for ex-vessel price negotiations) could also be liable under the antitrust laws.

Harvesters that go beyond the contemplated arbitration program and agree among themselves to sell at the arbitrated price could violate the antitrust laws. However, harvesters would be immune under the Fishermen's Cooperative Marketing Act (“FCMA”) if all participants in the arbitration are members of an eligible fishing cooperative.

Finally, the arbitration plan contemplates an exchange of competitively sensitive information which, if not handled properly, could raise antitrust concerns. Voluntary exchange of the information among competing harvesters and/or processors could violate the Sherman Act if it reduces competition. Harvesters and processors should be cautious in participating in any form of voluntary price arbitration or information exchange.

The Department's analysis here considers only the effects on competition of the proposals and whether participation in the program could result in antitrust violations. We have not considered other factors generally outside the purview of the antitrust laws, such as the social goal of protecting jobs in historic fishing villages or balancing the regulatory effects evenly among harvesters and processors. The Department is not in position to evaluate such interests. In making the ultimate recommendations, NOAA and the Council may wish to take such goals into account and balance them against the competition issues discussed here.

BACKGROUND

In developing its recommendations, the Department reviewed the rationalization plan, interviewed industry participants and examined economic research on rationalization programs. It is our understanding that the current derby-style system of fishery management works as follows: Each year, under joint management with the Council and NOAA Fisheries, the State of Alaska sets the total allowable catch (“TAC”) for each fishery for the year. Once the fishing season is opened, harvesters are permitted to fish until projections determine that the TAC is reached. The fishing season is then closed. The season varies by fishery but can be very short, as little as 2 to 3 days at the fishery with the shortest season. A natural result of this system is that a “race to fish” developed, which led to overcapitalization among harvesters and processors and to behavior that is dangerous to harvesters and results in less precise stock management.
In 2001, Congress directed the Council to determine whether rationalization of the fisheries under its management was needed. The Council was asked to analyze, among other things, the effects of IFQ and IPQ.

The Council detailed its proposal for rationalization of BSAI crab fisheries in its August 2002 Report to Congress and its May 6, 2003, letter to Congress. Under the proposed plan, crab harvesters would be allocated IFQ "shares" for 100% of the TAC in a fishery. Ninety percent of these shares would be Class A shares that must be processed by a processor within that fishery who holds IPQ. Ten percent would be Class B shares, which could be processed by any processor. The amount of IFQ issued to a particular harvester would be based on that harvester's historical catch in a fishery, computed over a qualifying period. IFQ shares would be fully transferable to anyone meeting certain requirements, subject to a limit on the number of shares that can be held by an IPQ holder. The shares would be leasable by any IPQ holder for the first five years of the program and thereafter leasable only within harvester cooperatives.

Similarly, processors in each rationalized fishery would be allocated IPQ shares. IPQ shares would be issued for 90% of the allocated harvest, corresponding to harvester Class A shares. The amount of IPQ issued to a particular processor would be based on that processor's historical processing activity, computed over a qualifying period. No processor would be allowed to hold more than 30% of the IPQ in its fishery. The proposed rationalization plan includes a number of community protection provisions that limit the liquidity of processor shares.

The proposal includes a plan for binding arbitration to determine the price paid by a processor to harvesters for raw crabs, the ex-vessel price, if the parties cannot reach mutually

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4 The Council plan would apply to eight fisheries, which constitute all the large Alaskan Crab fisheries.

5 The Council also proposes creating Class C shares to distribute 3% of the TAC to fishing vessel captains. This 3% will be allocated first, with the remaining 97% of the TAC being allocated to the remaining harvesters. For the first three years fishing vessel captains may sell their catch to anyone they wish. After three years, the captains must sell 90% of their 3% to IPQ holders, and may sell the other 10% of their 3% to any processor.

6 To be eligible to purchase IFQ a person would have to be a U.S. citizen and have at least 150 days of sea time as a harvester in a U.S. fishery. Share limits vary by fishery and are between 1% and 10% of the TAC. However, various methods exist to allow IFQ holders to combine shares. For example, subject to vessel caps, more than one IFQ holder may fish off of a single boat. In addition, there is no limit to the amount of IFQ that can be controlled by a cooperative.

7 The "ex-vessel" price is the price paid for fish offloaded directly from the fishing vessel.
agreeable terms. The Council’s preferred arbitration method is a “last best offer plan” under which the arbitrator’s primary goal is to set a price that preserves the historical division of revenues between harvesters and processors.\textsuperscript{5} The Council also proposes a pre-season, non-binding fleet-wide arbitration to develop and announce a guideline ex-vessel price for each fishery\textsuperscript{6} that will “inform price negotiations between the parties, as well as the Last Best Offer arbitration in the event of failed price negotiations.”\textsuperscript{7}

ANALYSIS

I. INDIVIDUAL FISHING QUOTAS

The current derby-style management of the crab fisheries has led to a race to fish. With the TAC fixed, harvesters must fish quickly to maximize their share of the harvest, and thus they overinvest in crew, equipment and boats, and they engage in behavior that is dangerous to harvesters and makes product management more difficult. Similarly, because the catch is spoilable, processors overcapitalize so that they can accept and process the catch in a very short amount of time. This overcapitalization by harvesters and processors is economically inefficient.

The source of the overinvestment problem for both harvesters and processors is the incentive to race for the crabs. One way to solve these kinds of problems is to create permanent property rights in the harvest, as in the proposed IFQ program. Such programs have demonstrably lengthened the harvesting season and reduced capacity in many other fisheries, for example, in the halibut and sablefish markets.\textsuperscript{8}

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\textsuperscript{5}Our understanding of the Council’s binding arbitration proposal is based on the February 2, 2003, Council Motion on Crab Rationalization.

\textsuperscript{6}On April 5, 2003, in a Council Motion on C-2 Crab Rationalization, the Council added the proposal for pre-season non-binding arbitration. Our understanding of the non-binding arbitration is based on the April 5, 2003 Council Motion on C-2 Crab Rationalization, the April 2003 Council News and Notes, and the May 6, 2003 Council letter to Congress. It is unclear from the language in those documents whether the non-binding arbitration will produce one benchmark price for all crab fisheries or whether it will produce a separate benchmark price for each fishery.

\textsuperscript{7}April 5, 2003 Council Motion on C-2 Crab Rationalization. In the May 6, 2003, letter to Congress the purpose of non-binding arbitration is described as follows: “The non-binding price formula is intended to provide a benchmark price that will be a starting point for negotiations and minimize the number of price disputes as negotiations progress.”

\textsuperscript{8}General Accounting Office, Individual Fishing Quotas (GAO-03-159, December 2002) at 20.
If the race to fish were ended, harvesters (and processors) would be left with an excess of capital investments. Endowing harvesters with tradable shares would compensate them for these investments. Each harvester would receive a permanent property right to fish based loosely on his investment in capital. Those harvesters who leave the market could sell their shares and therefore receive compensation.¹²

The Council has proposed to allocate IFQ to harvesters based on a harvester’s historical participation in a fishery. We have no reason to believe that such allocation will result in an unreasonably inefficient distribution of IFQ. If shares are made transferable, so that they could be sold or leased to more efficient harvesters, any inefficiencies in the initial distribution should be temporary.

IFQ programs have the potential to reduce capital investments below the optimal level. Ideally, a rationalization program would preserve the competition that incentivizes participants to make optimal investments and remove the incentive to overinvest. However, in a quota program, participants may inefficiently underinvest in capital, since they no longer can increase their profits by competing shares away from others. Efficiency can be preserved by creating a liquid market for quota shares. In other words, the ability to buy and sell IFQ freely guarantees that the most efficient market participants will harvest the catch. Rather than taking share from competitors, a firm buys (or leases) shares from less efficient firms, allowing the market to realize the efficiency gains. As the market for quota becomes less liquid, such as restrictions on leasing or absentee owner provisions, inefficiencies will arise.¹³

The proposed rationalization plan has provisions limiting liquidity, such as the prohibition on leasing IFQ outside of cooperatives after the fifth year. To the extent NOAA supports goals other than economic efficiency, it should weigh those goals against the potential for reducing economic efficiency and urge that those goals be accomplished in a manner least harmful to the market.

¹²The Department offers no view on whether harvesters (or, as we discuss later, processors) should be compensated for overcapitalization, but urges NOAA to consider the effects on economic efficiency of the compensation plan. For example, auctioning the initial shares instead, which would not compensate harvesters, could improve efficiency. In addition, an auction would capture for the public some of the value from the scarce resource, which could be used for public purposes. The proceeds could, for example, be reinvested in the fisheries, used to fund conservation programs or used to partially compensate harvesters and/or processors for overcapitalization.

¹³The market would also not function efficiently if harvesters had strategic reasons for holding shares, for example to prevent entry.
II. INDIVIDUAL PROCESSOR QUOTAS

The second part of the proposed rationalization plan is to issue IPQ, which no fishery in the United States to date has implemented. Using IPQ likely will reduce competition among processors, which could discourage efficient investments, limit new product development, and undercut competition in selling processed crab products. With IPQ, any efficiency losses are balanced against efficiency gains — eliminating incentives for harvesters and processors to overcapitalize as well as improving stock management and safety. In contrast, there are no such IPQ benefits. Thus, we urge NOAA to oppose processor quotas, because of their anticompetitive effect, and to accomplish the program's other goals in ways that do not limit competition.

A. Effect on Competition of IPQ

1. Inefficient investment

In a market without IPQ, when a processor invests in technology to lower its costs, it can increase profits by offering harvesters a slightly higher ex-vessel price and thereby win a greater share of the catch. Under an IPQ program, the same investment may not be profitable because it will lower costs only on the processor's quota share of the market. The processor cannot earn further profits by taking share from other processors. Thus, some efficiency enhancing investments that would have been profitable in the absence of IPQ may not be made under this proposed program.

The current proposal also does not take full advantage of ways to mitigate these inefficiencies. First, the creation of Class B IPQ shares could preserve some of the investment incentives for processors. However, preserving competition for the small percentage of the harvest represented by Class B shares is unlikely to preserve fully the incentive to make optimal investments. Second, these inefficiencies could be mitigated by making the market for IPQ as liquid as possible. However, the current plan appears to impose significant restrictions on the liquidity of IPQ. We understand that many of the limitations are designed to protect the historic interests of fishing communities. NOAA and the Council should address these conflicting goals.

2. Fewer new products

IPQ could also stifle new product development. What new products might appear under different regulations is difficult to predict, but some markets changed to IPQ-only programs have developed in positive ways. For example, ending the race to fish in the halibut fisheries may have contributed to an expansion in the delivery of fresh halibut.

Market participants expect similar product innovations in processed crab. But issuing IPQ could curtail the creation of such new products. First, new entrants that might to develop new products may have difficulty acquiring IPQ, either because of the limitation imposed on their transferability or because existing processors want to deter entry. Only the 10 percent of the
market covered by Class B shares is fully available to competition. Second, some existing processors might be better positioned to create new products, but limited by their endowed IPQ and constraints on acquiring additional shares. Third, any processor’s incentives to make investments in new products is limited by its endowed share of IPQ and constraints in the market for IPQ. While increasing the liquidity of IPQ could mitigate some of these concerns, we see no countervailing efficiency benefit from IPQ to justify these potential problems.

3. Less competition

Crab processors produce multiple products for different consumers using different techniques. Market participants we interviewed stated that ending the race to fish would only increase product differentiation because processors would have more time to work with the crabs. The likely result is that more of the harvest will be devoted to higher value products and that prices of these products will fall. Endowed processor shares and transferability limits might reduce this competition by altering processors’ incentives to invest in capital that would lower their costs, a benefit that could be passed to consumers, or by altering product mix.

B. Arguments by IPQ Proponents

Proponents seem to make two arguments in favor of implementing IPQ. First, they argue that, if harvesters are to be endowed with IPQ to compensate them for stranded capital, then processors should also be compensated by endowing them with IPQ. They state that overcapitalized processors will bid up the ex-vessel price, shifting economic rents from processors to harvesters. In response, it is likely that overcapitalization is a short-run problem, and thus creating a permanent property right to compensate processors is an inefficient solution. If NOAA believes that processors should be compensated, a direct one-time buyback of capital from processors would be more desirable.

Second, IPQ proponents argue that any rationalization plan must make all participants no worse off than under the current regime. Undoubtedly, some participants will benefit from changes while other will not, but the experience of other fisheries suggests that long run winners and losers are hard to predict. For example, the GAO concluded that the halibut IFQ-only program had a varied effect on processors; some were better off and some worse off.  

\[14\] Without compensation, many processors will likely be worse off in the time it takes for processors to remove unprofitable capital from the crab markets. How quickly capital adjusts to its optimal level will depend on the ex-vessel price and the value of alternative uses of that capital.


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III  ARBITRATION AND INFORMATION EXCHANGE

You have specifically asked us whether the system of binding arbitration as described in the Council Motion on Crab Rationalization, dated February 2, 2003, would violate the antitrust laws if it were not legislated but instead were instituted by agreement among harvesters and processors. Below we address the legality of participating in the binding and non-binding arbitration, the economic effects of the proposed arbitration, and whether sharing the information submitted to the arbitrator among harvesters and processors could violate the antitrust laws.

Based on the documents cited in footnotes 9 and 10, we understand that the arbitration process will work as follows: Prior to the harvesting season, harvesters and processors in each crab fishery will jointly appoint a market analyst/arbitrator to review harvester and processor data and market conditions and announce a pre-season formula for setting a non-binding ex-vessel price. The stated purpose of developing a non-binding price is to guide the individual negotiations between processors and harvesters and later to guide the arbitrator in the binding arbitration process. After the non-binding price is announced, processors and harvesters may then negotiate contracts, subject to the amount of IFQ and IFQ they hold. Harvesters can make joint or individual bids. Harvesters that are unable to make a contract with a processor through negotiation may choose to use binding arbitration (or wait and later use the price that is developed in others’ arbitrations). In the arbitrations that do proceed, separate and independent arbitration using a “last best offer” method is conducted for each processor.\(^{16}\) All harvesters who entered arbitration with a processor will receive that processor’s arbitrated price.\(^{17}\) Harvesters who earlier waited and did not arbitrate can then choose a processor and will receive the price that was developed in the binding arbitration conducted with other harvesters.\(^{18}\)

\(^{16}\) If several groups of IFQ holders have matched with an IPQ holder, each may make a last best offer.

\(^{17}\) The Council’s recommended arbitration proposal charges the arbitrator with establishing a price that “preserves the historic division of revenues in the fisheries” while considering elements including current ex-vessel prices; consumer and wholesale product prices for the processing sector; innovations, developments, efficiency and productivity of the different sectors; and the interest of maintaining financial health of the different sectors.

\(^{18}\) Of course, harvesters may choose a processor only until that processor’s IPQ is filled. It is not clear how harvesters who did not arbitrate will be matched to processors with remaining IPQ. If the ex-vessel price developed in arbitration for one processor is high, there may be excess demand by harvesters to opt into this arbitrated price. How that excess demand will be rationed is unclear.
A. Legality of Participating in Arbitration

As we understand the proposed arbitration program, participation by harvesters and processors is voluntary. For a harvester and processor to independently choose to use arbitration to develop the price at which they will agree to trade crabs would not violate the antitrust laws. However, if processors agree among themselves to use arbitration or to adhere to a price developed in arbitration, that agreement likely would violate the antitrust laws. The same is true for harvesters, except that harvesters may have immunity under the FCMA. These liability and immunity questions are discussed below.

1. Horizontal Agreements on Price

An agreement by a group of harvesters or processors to trade crabs at a price set by an arbitrator could be viewed as a naked agreement not to compete on price and thus an automatic or “per se” violation of Sherman Act §1, 15 U.S.C. §1. It is well established that an agreement for the purpose of “raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing” price is illegal per se. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940). Even if the agreed price is set by a third party such as an arbitrator, all that matters for liability is that competitors agreed to charge that same price. In addition, liability here would extend to harvesters that agree among themselves to participate in the arbitration process and harvesters who later join that agreement by opting in once the arbitrator sets a price; they too would be fixing the ex-vessel price by agreeing with their competitors to abide by the arbitrator’s decision.

Harvesters or processors may violate the antitrust law even if they agree with competitors only to use the pre-season benchmark price as a starting point for negotiations. If ex-vessel prices were affected by the non-binding arbitration (as the rationalization plan intends), a court could reasonably infer that the non-binding arbitration was part of an illegal price fixing agreement.

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19 In some limited circumstances, an agreement to set price could be examined under a “rule of reason,” which requires the court to “assess and balance a restraint’s harms benefits and alternatives”. VII Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp Antitrust Law ¶1508a (2nd ed. 2003) For a discussion of analyzing agreements among competitors, see Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors (Federal Trade Commission & U.S. Department of Justice, April 2000).

20 Plymouth Dealers' Association of Northern California v. United States, 279 F.2d 128, 132 (9th Cir. 1960) (“The competition between the Plymouth dealers and the fact that the dealers used the fixed uniform list price in most instances only as a starting point, is of no consequence. It was an agreed starting point; it had been agreed upon between competitors; it was in some instances in the record respected and followed; it had to do with, and had its effect upon, price.” [footnote omitted]).
Under the proposed binding arbitration, processors will not violate the antitrust laws so long as each participates individually, as required by the Council's arbitration proposal. Harvester will not violate the antitrust laws so long as each participates individually or as part of an FCMA cooperative. 21

2. Antitrust immunity for fishermen's cooperatives

Harvesters can avoid antitrust liability for the conduct described above by joining a fisherman's cooperative. Under the Fishermen's Cooperative Marketing Act, 48 Stat. 1213 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §521, harvesters that join a cooperative and set prices in a manner consistent with the FCMA will be exempt from of the antitrust laws with respect to that price setting. United States v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Assn., 362 U.S. 458, 466-467 (1960). 22 However, the cooperatives participating in arbitration must include only members who are eligible for immunity under the statute; if a cooperative includes members who are not eligible for antitrust immunity under the FCMA, the entire cooperative loses its immunity. National Broiler Mkgt. Ass'n v. United States, 436 U.S. 816, 828-829 (1978); Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 339 U.S. 384 (1967); Hinote, 823 F. Supp. at 1354.

a. Vertically integrated harvester-processors

An important issue is whether a harvester that is vertically integrated with a processor can be a member of an FCMA fishermen's cooperative. The Supreme Court explicitly declined to decide this issue in National Broiler, U.S. 436 at 828, n. 21. The Hinote court found that vertically integrated catfish processors were not exempt from the antitrust laws for conspiring to fix the prices of catfish products. However, the activity challenged in the case was not the processors' conduct as farmers but their conduct in selling finished catfish products. Hinote, 823 F. Supp. at 1358-1359. Under Hinote it still is possible that a vertically integrated harvester could join an FCMA cooperative and be exempt from antitrust liability with respect to its activities as a harvester, making an agreement to set the ex-vessel price of crabs. In determining whether a vertically integrated harvester can be a cooperative member without causing a cooperative to lose its immunity, a court is likely to look at a variety of factors, including the nature of its harvester and processor activities, the extent to which its activities are integrated, and the precise nature of the challenged agreement among cooperative members. See id.

21Although processors do not have immunity under the FCMA, a processor that participates in arbitration solely as a buyer should have no antitrust liability even if a group of harvesters with whom the processor negotiates are found to have engaged in non-immune price fixing.

22The Maryland case, as well as other cases concerning cooperative exemptions was decided under the Capper-Volstead Act of 1922, 42 Stat. 388 (1922), 7 U.S.C. §291 which provides for the same kinds exemptions as the FCMA. Cases decided under Capper-Volstead are precedent for cases under the FCMA. U.S. v. Hinote, 823 F. Supp. 1350 (S.D. Miss. 1993).
b. Agreements between cooperatives and non-members

Under the FCMA, cooperatives may not combine with non-cooperatives or “restrain trade by combining with nonexempt parties to set either resale prices for the cooperative’s products or purchase prices paid to their nonmember competitors.” IA Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶1508a (2nd ed. 2000) Thus, it is possible that all harvesters in a cooperative could lose their Capper-Volstead immunity if the cooperative and non-member harvesters agreed to participate in binding arbitration with the same processor.

We are unaware of any direct authority on whether a cooperative can act collectively with persons who are eligible to join but have not done so. Of course, legal immunities are narrowly construed, and antitrust immunity under the FCMA in particular has been strictly interpreted.23 One reason that the immunity might not be read to allow agreement with non-members is that non-members are not subject to regulatory oversight. Both the FCMA and Capper-Volstead allow regulators to challenge conduct otherwise immune from the antitrust laws if the regulator believes that the price of an agricultural product is “unduly enhanced” by the activities of the cooperative.24 A harvester that is not a member of a cooperative would not be subject to this oversight. Thus, it would be inconsistent with the intent of the statute to allow harvesters to enjoy the antitrust immunity afforded cooperative members.

3. Legality of information exchanges

We understand that processors and harvesters participating in binding arbitration wish to have access to all information used by the arbitrators, including information from arbitrations between other harvesters and other processors.25 Thus, each harvester and processor would see the data submitted to the arbitrator by every other harvester and processor. Such exchange of competitive information could violate the antitrust laws.

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23See, e.g., Hinote, 423 F. Supp. at 1354 (In order to have antitrust immunity under the FCMA defendant must establish that not only was the cooperative entitled to FCMA protection, but that all entities with which defendant allegedly conspired were entitled to protection.), Case-Swayne, 339 U.S. at 393 (Capper-Volstead Act is a special exception to a general legislative plan and therefore Court is not justified in expanding the Act’s coverage.).


25The February 2, 2003, Council Motion on Crab Rationalization states “Subject to limitations of antitrust laws and the need for proprietary confidentiality, all parties to an arbitration proceeding shall have access to all information provided to the arbitrator(s) in that proceeding.” We have been informed by NOAA staff and Council staff that processors and harvesters would be given data from arbitrations that they did not participate in.
Information exchanges can be procompetitive, and therefore they are not automatically illegal but are examined under a rule of reason. *United States v. Citizens & Southern National Bank*, 422 U.S. 86, 113 (1975). An agreement among competitors to exchange information can be a violation of the Sherman Act if it is found to have an anticompetitive effect. *Todd v. Exxon Corp.*, 275 F.3d 191, 198-199 (2nd Cir., 2001), even without an agreement to adhere to a particular price.26

We cannot say that the transfer of any particular type of data would be benign. When price, capacity, and cost data are shared among competitors, the ability to monitor a collusive agreement for "cheating" can improve significantly; thus, if the inability to monitor collusion is a significant factor in preventing an agreement, data transfers can make an agreement possible. Similarly, when firms interact repeatedly in a market, exchanges of price data can help them reach a collusive price even without an explicit agreement; thus, if processors are exchanging wholesale crab product price data, they may be able to use that exchange to reach an implicit agreement on prices for those products.27

The information that would be disseminated here includes data on historical distribution of wholesale crab product revenues between harvesters and processors,28 the pre-season market report (the outcome of the non-binding arbitration), other data on market prices and completed arbitrations, and data voluntarily submitted by IFQ and IPQ holders. If that data were

26*United States v. Container Corp. of America*, 393 U.S. 333, 1336 (1969) ("exchange of price information seemed to have the effect of keeping prices within a fairly narrow ambit."); see also *United States v. United States Gypsum Company*, 438 U.S. 422 (1978), ("exchanges of current price information, of course, have the greatest potential for generating anticompetitive effects and although not per se unlawful have consistently been held to violate the Sherman Act").

27In some cases, disseminating information to buyers and sellers can be pro-competitive if that information facilitates efficient trading. This procompetitive need for market information usually creates strong financial incentives for independent third parties to step in and provide that information. While we may be concerned that a market report could facilitate price fixing no matter who provides the information, when the competing market participants themselves organize to do it, those concerns are heightened. In the case of the market for raw crabs, the absence of third parties providing (or attempting to provide) this service currently makes us skeptical that informational problems are causing market failure; nor does the rationalization plan itself appear to create new informational problems. Finally, the benchmark price developed during non-binding arbitration does not appear to address any kind of market failure: With a stated purpose of reducing price disputes and guiding the decision of the arbitrator in the binding arbitration process, the benchmark price appears to be intended to facilitate an agreement to set prices.

28February 2, 2003, Council Motion on Crab Rationalization at 4.
disseminated to processors, it could facilitate agreements to fix prices or limit capacity for processed crab products, newly developed crab products, or crabs delivered by holders of Class B shares. The shared data could also effectively suppress price competition for processed crab products even without a direct agreement. For example, if a new product is developed and processors learn each others' capacity for that product, then that knowledge could soften price competition for that product.

We have been told that some price data is already largely public, but the quality of that information is not clear.29 If disseminating the data provides no new, improved or more accessible information to processors, then it likely is not problematic. However, if the exchange of data increases the quality or reliability of already public data, antitrust concerns could arise.

We were told in interviews that harvesters and processors want access to all data used by the arbitrator so that they can insure that the data is accurate. This might justify only very limited information exchanges that facilitate the arbitration process.30

C. Economic Effects of the Proposed Arbitration

One likely outcome of implementing either an IFQ-only or an IFQ-IPQ program is that bargaining power of harvesters and processors in negotiating ex-vessel prices will change, resulting in a new division of the economic rents created by crab harvesting and processing. Some argue that an IFQ-only program will shift bargaining power towards harvesters. Others argue that an IFQ-IPQ program will shift it towards processors.31

29If that data is largely "word of mouth," as we understand it is, the arbitration process could significantly improve the quality of information about prices.

30The arbitration proposal does not state whether data would be disseminated as it is received by the arbitrator or only after he has announced the price. If the data submitted in a given arbitration will be disseminated to participants in that arbitration as it is received, it could serve a purpose by enabling harvesters or processors to submit "rebuttal" data. However, we see no justification for harvesters or processors seeing data from arbitrations other than the ones in which they are participating. If the data is disseminated after the arbitrator has made his decision, the absence of a right of appeal of the decision appears to mean that there is no remedy available to a harvester or processor who believes that an arbitration decision was made on the basis of incorrect data and thus no need for the data to be disseminated.

31Because the Council proposes endowing IFQ and IPQ, rather than selling them, we assume these endowments are designed, at least in part, to compensate market participants for overcapitalization. If issuing both IFQ and IPQ rendered IFQ worthless because all bargaining power would accrue to processors (as some believe), then the compensation scheme would fail.
The Council has made it an explicit goal of the rationalization plan to preserve the historic division of revenues between processors and harvesters, and it has chosen the binding and non-binding arbitrations as its method for preserving that division. Apart from the antitrust concerns, arbitration to preserve the historic division of rents has the potential to inefficiently affect processor and harvester investment decisions. For example, processors could be deterred from making efficient investments because the arbitrator may, in the name of maintaining the historic division of revenues, transfer too much of the benefits from that investment to harvesters by setting the ex-vessel price too high. Conversely, setting the ex-vessel price too low could similarly deter harvesters from making efficient investments. When the division of rents is set by market mechanisms, the optimal investment decisions are preserved. In addition, this arbitration scheme is complex and could have many unpredictable and undesirable consequences as market participants learn how the system can be manipulated. For example, market participants have an incentive to manipulate the data they submit to the arbitrator to affect the perceived historic division of revenues or to distort (in their favor) the price required to meet this goal. Thus, there is no guarantee that arbitration can even meet its stated goal of preserving the historic division of revenues.

CONCLUSION

The Department endorses the proposed IFQ program. The current race to fish causes overcapitalization by harvesters and processors and results in market inefficiencies, danger to harvesters and difficulty in managing the crab population. The benefits from a system of readily tradeable IFQ in eliminating these externalities are likely to outweigh any negative effects of eliminating competition among harvesters.

The Department urges NOAA to oppose IPQ. Processor shares could deter product innovation, reduce the incentive for processors to make optimal investment decisions and raise prices for processed crab products, all without countervailing efficiency benefits.

32Because of the difficulties of measuring the division of economic rents, the Council recommends maintaining the historic division of revenues as a proxy for rents. However, some of the criteria the arbitrator is directed to consider, such as innovations and efficiencies, make it clear that the goal is to divide economic rents. BSAI Crab Rationalization Program Trailing Amendments, Community Protection Binding Arbitration, April 2002 at 21-23.

33We do not advocate substituting regulatory rate-making for market forces. We do note, however, that where legislators have chosen to have rates set by regulation they have instituted procedural rules that allow the quality of data used by the regulator to be tested and provide a right to appeal the regulator’s decision. In the case of the proposed arbitration system no such safeguards exist.
The Department urges NOAA to oppose the proposed non-binding and binding arbitration. The proposed arbitration could be used to facilitate price fixing agreements, and participants in the arbitration who are not immune from the antitrust laws because of membership in a FCMA cooperative could be in violation of those laws. Arbitration is not a substitute for market forces and may distort the incentives of processors and harvesters to make efficient investments. It is also unwieldy and complex, and thus subject to manipulation or significant error.

Based on the competition and antitrust law concerns that we have discussed, we urge NOAA to request that the Council develop a rationalization plan that does not include IPQ or arbitration.

Sincerely,

R. Hewitt Pate